Collective Intentionality by Jankovic, Marija & Ludwig, Kirk
Collective	  Intentionality	  
	  PREPRINT	  
	  in	  The	  Routledge	  Companion	  to	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Social	  Science,	  ed.,	  Lee	  McIntyre	  and	  Alex	  Rosenberg,	  New	  York:	  Routledge	  (2016)	  
	  Marija	  Jankovic	  and	  Kirk	  Ludwig	  	  	   1.	  	  Introduction	  .....................................................................................................................................................	  1	  2.	  Collective	  Action	  &	  Intention	  .....................................................................................................................	  2	  2.1	  Plural	  Agency	  ............................................................................................................................................	  2	  2.2	  Shared	  Intention	  ......................................................................................................................................	  3	  3.	  The	  role	  of	  collective	  intentionality	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  social	  .................................	  5	  3.1	  Singular	  Group	  Agents	  ..........................................................................................................................	  5	  3.2	  Conventions	  ...............................................................................................................................................	  6	  3.3	  Status	  Functions	  and	  Roles	  .................................................................................................................	  7	  3.4	  Institutions	  as	  networks	  of	  status	  roles	  ........................................................................................	  8	  3.5	  Proxy	  Agency	  in	  Institutional	  Action	  ..............................................................................................	  9	  3.6	  Social	  Norms	  and	  Status	  Functions	  ...............................................................................................	  10	  4.	  Collective	  Attitudes	  Other	  than	  Intention	  ..........................................................................................	  10	  5.	  Summary	  and	  Conclusion	  .........................................................................................................................	  13	  
	   1	  
1.	  	  Introduction	  	  Intentionality	  is	  the	  property	  of	  being	  about,	  or	  directed	  at,	  something.	  	  Your	  belief	  that	  Athens	  is	  the	  capital	  of	  Greece	  is	  about	  Athens	  being	  the	  capital	  of	  Greece.	  	  Your	  desire	  for	  another	  cup	  of	  coffee	  is	  about	  your	  having	  a	  cup	  of	  coffee.	  	  A	  state	  with	  intentionality	  is	  an	  intentional	  state.	  	  Paradigmatic	  intentional	  states	  are	  propositional	  attitudes	  such	  as	  beliefs,	  intentions,	  desires,	  and	  hopes.	  	  They	  have	  a	  psychological	  mode	  (belief,	  intention,	  desire,	  hope,	  etc.)	  and	  a	  propositional	  content	  (e.g.,	  that	  Athens	  is	  the	  capital	  of	  Greece),	  which	  may	  match	  or	  fail	  to	  match	  the	  world.	  	  	  	  	  Collective	  intentionality	  concerns	  intentionality	  in	  the	  social	  context.	  Its	  distinctive	  focus	  is	  the	  conceptual	  and	  psychological	  features	  of	  joint	  actions	  and	  attitudes,	  their	  relations	  to	  individual	  actions	  and	  attitudes,	  and	  the	  implications	  for	  the	  nature	  of	  social	  groups	  and	  their	  functioning.	  	  It	  subsumes	  the	  study	  of	  collective	  action,	  responsibility,	  reasoning,	  intention,	  emotion,	  phenomenology,	  knowledge,	  trust,	  rationality,	  responsibility,	  cooperation,	  and	  competition,	  and	  how	  these	  underpin	  social	  practices,	  norms,	  conventions,	  institutions	  and	  ontology.	  	  Collective	  intentionality	  is	  a	  growing	  interdisciplinary	  area	  of	  research	  with	  contributions	  from	  philosophy,	  psychology,	  political	  science,	  legal	  theory,	  linguistics,	  cognitive	  science,	  sociology,	  anthropology,	  and	  computer	  science.	  	  	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  we	  focus	  on	  collective	  action	  and	  intention,	  and	  their	  relation	  to	  conventions,	  status	  functions,	  norms,	  institutions,	  and	  shared	  attitudes	  more	  generally.	  	  Collective	  action	  and	  shared	  intention	  play	  a	  foundational	  role	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  social.	  	  	  The	  three	  central	  questions	  in	  the	  study	  of	  collective	  intentionality	  are:	  	   (1) What	  is	  the	  ontology	  of	  collective	  intentionality?	  	  In	  particular,	  are	  groups	  per	  se	  intentional	  agents,	  as	  opposed	  to	  just	  their	  individual	  members?	  	  (2) What	  is	  the	  psychology	  of	  collective	  intentionality?	  	  Do	  groups	  per	  se	  have	  psychological	  states,	  in	  particular	  propositional	  attitudes?	  	  What	  is	  the	  psychology	  of	  the	  individuals	  who	  participate	  in	  collective	  intentional	  behavior?	  	  What	  is	  special	  about	  their	  participatory	  intentions,	  their	  we-­‐intentions,	  as	  they	  are	  called	  (Tuomela	  and	  Miller	  1988),	  as	  opposed	  to	  their	  I-­‐intentions?	  (3) How	  is	  collective	  intentionality	  implicated	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  social	  reality?	  	  In	  particular,	  how	  does	  the	  content	  of	  we-­‐intentions	  and	  the	  intentional	  activity	  of	  individual	  agents	  create	  social	  institutions,	  practices	  and	  structures?	  	  Section	  2	  discusses	  collective	  action	  and	  shared	  intention	  in	  informal	  groups.	  	  Section	  3	  discusses	  mechanisms	  for	  constructing	  institutional	  structures	  out	  of	  the	  conceptual	  and	  psychological	  resources	  made	  available	  by	  our	  understanding	  of	  informal	  joint	  intentional	  action.	  	  It	  extends	  the	  discussion	  of	  collective	  action	  and	  intention	  to	  institutional	  groups,	  such	  as	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  and	  explains	  how	  concepts	  of	  such	  organizations	  are	  constructed	  out	  of	  the	  concepts	  of	  a	  rule,	  convention,	  and	  status	  function.	  	  Section	  4	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discusses	  collective	  attitudes	  beyond	  intention.	  	  Section	  5	  is	  a	  brief	  summary	  and	  conclusion.	  	  
2.	  Collective	  Action	  &	  Intention	  
2.1	  Plural	  Agency	  	  What	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  individual	  and	  collective	  action?	  	  We	  begin	  with	  actions	  attributed	  to	  informal	  groups	  picked	  out	  using	  plural	  referring	  terms.	  	  We	  call	  these	  plural	  
group	  agents,	  without	  implying	  they	  are	  agents	  per	  se.	  	  We	  can	  sharpen	  our	  initial	  question	  by	  asking	  what	  the	  difference	  is	  between	  the	  truth	  conditions	  for	  [1]	  and	  [2].	  	  [1]	  	   I	  moved	  a	  bench	  [2]	  	   We	  moved	  a	  bench	  	  	  The	  parallel	  forms	  of	  [1]	  and	  [2]	  seem	  to	  commit	  us	  to	  the	  subject	  in	  [2],	  a	  group,	  being	  the	  agent	  of	  a	  bench	  moving,	  and	  so	  to	  group	  agents	  per	  se.	  	  However,	  initial	  appearances	  are	  misleading.	  	  To	  see	  this,	  we	  bring	  to	  bear	  the	  event	  analysis	  of	  singular	  action	  sentences	  like	  [1]	  (Davidson	  2001)	  on	  the	  distributive/collective	  ambiguity	  of	  plural	  action	  sentences	  like	  [2]	  (Ludwig	  2007a,	  2010).	  	  	  	  On	  the	  event	  analysis,	  [1]	  says	  its	  subject	  is	  the	  agent	  of	  an	  event.	  For	  present	  purposes,	  we	  ignore	  tense	  and	  some	  details	  about	  how	  verbs	  select	  determinate	  forms	  of	  the	  agency	  relation	  (Ludwig	  2007a;	  2016a,	  ch.	  6).	  	  We	  analyze	  [1]	  as	  in	  [1a]	  (where	  ‘(∃e)’	  means	  ‘there	  is	  an	  event	  e	  such	  that’).	  	  [1a]	  	   (∃e)(I	  am	  an	  agent	  of	  e	  and	  e	  is	  a	  bench’s	  moving	  and	  only	  I	  am	  an	  agent	  of	  e)	  	  [2]	  can	  be	  read	  distributively	  or	  collectively.	  	  Read	  distributively,	  it	  means	  that	  each	  of	  us	  moved	  a	  bench,	  as	  in	  [1d].	  	  The	  collective	  reading	  derives	  from	  giving	  each	  of	  us	  narrow	  scope	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  event	  quantifier.	  [2]	  says	  that	  there	  is	  some	  event	  of	  which	  each	  of	  us	  is	  an	  agent	  and	  no	  one	  else	  is	  (thus	  adjusting	  the	  requirement	  of	  sole	  agency	  also)	  and	  it	  is	  a	  bench’s	  moving,	  as	  in	  [1c].	  	  	  	  [1d]	   [Each	  x	  of	  us](∃e)(x	  is	  an	  agent	  of	  e	  and	  e	  is	  a	  bench’s	  moving	  and	  only	  x	  is	  an	  agent	  of	  e)	  [1c]	   (∃e)[Each	  x	  of	  us](x	  is	  an	  agent	  of	  e	  and	  e	  is	  a	  bench’s	  moving	  and	  only	  we	  are	  agents	  of	  e)	  	  The	  difference	  lies	  (to	  a	  first	  approximation)	  in	  whether	  we	  are	  saying	  each	  of	  us	  did	  something	  to	  bring	  about	  an	  event	  of	  a	  certain	  type	  or	  that	  there	  is	  an	  event	  of	  a	  certain	  type	  each	  of	  us	  contributed	  to	  bringing	  about.	  	  On	  this	  account	  of	  the	  collective	  reading	  of	  plural	  action	  sentences,	  then,	  we	  have	  no	  need	  for	  group	  agents	  per	  se.	  	  We	  still	  refer	  to	  groups,	  but	  only	  their	  members	  are	  agents.	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2.2	  Shared	  Intention	  	  We	  act	  together	  intentionally	  when	  we	  successfully	  execute	  a	  shared	  intention.	  We	  attribute	  shared	  intentions	  with	  sentences	  like	  [3].	  	  	  	  [3]	  	   We	  intend	  to	  move	  a	  bench.	  	  [3]	  has	  a	  distributive	  reading,	  [3d].	  	  	  	  [3d]	   Each	  of	  us	  intends	  (himself)	  to	  move	  a	  bench.	  	  Our	  interest	  lies	  in	  the	  collective	  reading	  on	  which	  we	  intend	  to	  move	  a	  bench	  together.	  	  On	  the	  collective	  reading,	  [3]	  attributed	  a	  shared	  intention	  to	  move	  a	  bench.	  	  Some	  authors	  take	  shared	  intentions	  to	  be	  states	  of	  groups	  as	  such	  (Velleman	  1997;	  List	  and	  Pettit	  2011;	  Pettit	  2003;	  Tollefsen	  2002;	  Copp	  2006;	  Stoutland	  1997,	  2008).	  	  But,	  prima	  facie,	  if	  we	  don't	  need	  group	  agents	  for	  collective	  action,	  we	  don’t	  need	  them	  as	  subjects	  of	  shared	  intention	  (we	  turn	  to	  institutional	  agency	  below).	  We	  therefore	  treat	  the	  subject	  of	  [3]	  distributively	  even	  on	  the	  collective	  reading,	  as	  in	  [3c].	  	  [3c]	  	   Each	  of	  us	  intends	  that	  we	  move	  a	  bench	  together.	  	  	  On	  this	  view,	  for	  us	  to	  share	  an	  intention	  is	  for	  each	  to	  have	  an	  appropriate	  intention	  to	  participate	  in	  our	  doing	  something,	  a	  we-­‐intention	  as	  opposed	  to	  an	  I-­‐intention.	  	  The	  problem	  of	  shared	  intention	  then	  reduces	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  we-­‐intentions.	  	  	  	  There	  are	  number	  of	  competing	  analyses	  of	  we-­‐intentions.	  	  	  John	  Searle	  (1990,	  1995,	  2010)	  holds	  that	  we-­‐intentions	  are	  intentions	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  joint	  action	  by	  way	  of	  an	  individual	  contribution.	  	  (Searle	  is	  often	  said	  to	  hold	  that	  we-­‐intending	  is	  primitive,	  but	  Ludwig	  argues	  that	  this	  is	  a	  misinterpretation	  (2007b).)	  	  This	  isn’t	  sufficient,	  as	  each	  of	  us	  could	  intend	  to	  bring	  it	  about	  that	  we	  do	  something	  together	  but	  have	  it	  in	  mind	  to	  trick	  the	  other	  into	  doing	  his	  part.	  For	  example,	  suppose	  that	  each	  of	  us	  intends	  to	  go	  to	  NYC	  with	  the	  other	  and	  wants	  to	  take	  the	  more	  expensive	  fast	  train,	  but	  thinks	  that	  the	  other	  intends	  to	  take	  the	  slower	  train.	  Each	  could	  then	  plan	  to	  get	  the	  other	  to	  board	  the	  fast	  train	  by	  tricking	  her	  into	  thinking	  that	  the	  train	  currently	  on	  the	  platform	  is	  the	  slow	  one	  (by	  moving	  her	  clock	  forward).	  In	  this	  case,	  though	  each	  of	  us	  intends	  that	  we	  go	  to	  NYC	  by	  way	  of	  something	  she	  does,	  we	  don’t	  share	  an	  intention	  to	  go	  to	  NYC.	  	  	  	  Margaret	  Gilbert	  (2006)	  explains	  shared	  intention	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  primitive	  notion	  of	  joint	  commitment.	  When	  we	  share	  an	  intention,	  we	  jointly	  commit	  to	  doing	  something	  (e.g.,	  moving	  a	  bench)	  as	  a	  body.	  This	  joint	  commitment	  entails	  sui	  generis	  obligations	  of	  each	  party	  to	  do	  her	  part.	  These	  obligations	  are	  owed	  to	  the	  other	  parties	  and	  cannot	  be	  unilaterally	  rescinded.	  The	  parties,	  however,	  need	  not	  have	  any	  particular	  individual	  intentions	  (contra	  Searle,	  Bratman,	  Ludwig).	  	  If	  Gilbert	  is	  right,	  all	  joint	  intentional	  action	  involves	  norms	  internal	  to	  its	  nature.	  	  However,	  while	  it	  is	  widely	  accepted	  that	  obligations	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with	  the	  content	  Gilbert	  describes	  typically	  accompany	  collective	  intention,	  it	  is	  controversial	  whether	  they	  necessarily	  accompany	  it	  (Bratman	  1999b).	  	  	  	  David	  Velleman	  (1997)	  has	  argued	  that	  shared	  intentions	  are	  realized	  in	  interlocking	  speech	  acts—one	  person	  saying,	  e.g.,	  I	  will	  if	  you	  will,	  and	  the	  other	  saying	  I	  will—which	  jointly	  cause	  their	  own	  conditions	  of	  satisfaction.	  	  But	  this	  cannot	  cover	  all	  cases	  of	  shared	  intention.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  worry	  that	  if	  each	  group	  member	  intends	  that	  they	  do	  something,	  then	  counter-­‐intuitively	  each	  thinks	  he	  will	  determine	  what	  the	  others	  do—which	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  incorrect	  (Bratman	  1999a).	  	  Accounts	  of	  we-­‐intentions	  have	  also	  been	  advanced	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  special	  sort	  of	  reasoning	  (team	  reasoning)	  leading	  to	  joint	  action	  (Gold	  and	  Sugden	  2007).	  	  But	  team	  reasoning,	  although	  directed	  at	  a	  group	  interest,	  is	  reasoning	  of	  individuals	  who	  are	  deciding	  strategically	  in	  light	  of	  what	  others	  will	  do.	  It	  is	  therefore	  compatible	  with	  their	  having	  only	  I-­‐intentions	  directed	  at	  that	  group	  interest.	  	  Raimo	  Tuomela	  (Tuomela	  and	  Miller	  1988;	  Tuomela	  2005,	  2013)	  has	  championed	  a	  conception	  of	  we-­‐intentions	  as	  intentions	  to	  do	  one’s	  part	  in	  the	  group’s	  doing	  something	  together,	  under	  conditions	  of	  mutual	  belief	  about	  others	  in	  the	  group	  so	  intending	  and	  the	  conditions	  for	  a	  reasonable	  chance	  of	  success	  being	  in	  place.	  	  However,	  Tuomela	  notes	  specifically	  (2005)	  that	  	  by	  ‘the	  group’s	  doing	  something	  together’	  he	  means	  ‘the	  group’s	  doing	  something	  together	  intentionally’	  (contra	  Searle’s	  (1990)	  interpretation).	  	  Consequently,	  he	  does	  not	  aim	  to	  give	  a	  fully	  reductive	  account	  of	  we-­‐intentions	  since	  the	  analysis	  uses	  a	  concept	  related	  to	  the	  concept	  it	  analyzes	  in	  giving	  the	  content	  of	  the	  intention.	  	  	  In	  contrast,	  Michael	  Bratman’s	  influential	  account	  of	  we-­‐intentions	  gives	  a	  reductive	  account	  of	  their	  content	  (1992,	  1993,	  1999a,	  1999b,	  2006,	  2014).	  	  He	  holds	  that	  a	  we-­‐intention	  is	  an	  intention	  of	  an	  individual	  that	  a	  group	  she	  belongs	  to	  do	  something	  by	  way	  of	  meshing	  (i.e.,	  compossible)	  subplans	  associated	  with	  each	  member’s	  intention	  that	  the	  group	  do	  it.	  	  A	  virtue	  of	  this	  account	  is	  that	  it	  captures	  the	  idea	  that	  joint	  intentional	  action	  is	  fundamentally	  collaborative.	  This	  is	  implied	  by	  the	  requirement	  that	  each	  member	  of	  the	  group	  intend	  that	  the	  subplans	  they	  associate	  with	  their	  intentions	  mesh.	  	  This	  element	  rules	  out	  the	  case	  of	  mutually	  intended	  deception	  toward	  the	  same	  goal	  considered	  above.	  In	  this	  case,	  each	  intends	  that	  we	  go	  to	  NYC	  in	  part	  by	  way	  of	  the	  other’s	  intentions	  that	  we	  go.	  But	  each	  intends	  to	  deceive	  the	  other	  into	  taking	  the	  fast	  train,	  rather	  than	  to	  arrive	  at	  compatible	  subplans.	  	  An	  important	  question	  is	  how	  much	  mesh	  of	  subplans	  is	  required	  (Ludwig	  2015a):	  all	  seems	  too	  strict	  (one	  can	  intend	  not	  to	  be	  fully	  cooperative,	  but	  cooperative	  enough	  to	  get	  the	  job	  done);	  some	  seems	  not	  strict	  enough	  (we	  can	  intend	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  others’	  plans	  up	  to	  a	  point	  only).	  	  	  	  A	  similar	  reductive	  approach,	  motivated	  by	  semantic	  considerations,	  is	  Ludwig’s	  (2007a,	  2016a).	  He	  understands	  we-­‐intentions	  as	  intentions	  to	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  group	  doing	  a	  particular	  thing	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  shared	  plan	  (which	  need	  not	  be	  given	  ahead	  of	  time),	  where	  the	  shared	  plan	  incorporates	  a	  margin	  for	  error	  around	  a	  canonical	  plan	  conception.	  	  Modest	  deviations	  from	  the	  canonical	  plan	  are	  compatible	  with	  the	  group	  carrying	  out	  the	  plan	  successfully.	  	  This	  helps	  avoid	  the	  problem	  of	  degree	  of	  mesh	  that	  Bratman’s	  account	  faces.	  	  It	  also	  rules	  out	  cases	  of	  mutual	  deception	  because	  in	  that	  case	  the	  agents	  do	  not	  	  intend	  there	  be	  a	  shared	  plan	  in	  accordance	  with	  which	  they	  both	  act.	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Both	  accounts	  accommodate	  joint	  intentional	  action	  involving	  competition.	  	  For	  the	  participants	  cooperate	  in	  bringing	  about	  an	  action	  type	  that	  specifies	  that	  they	  compete	  
within	  a	  framework	  of	  rules	  to	  achieve	  an	  end	  that	  not	  all	  can	  attain.	  	  	  	  Other	  important	  accounts,	  which	  we	  lack	  space	  to	  discuss,	  are	  those	  of	  Seumas	  Miller	  (2001)	  in	  terms	  of	  intentions	  directed	  at	  shared	  ends,	  and	  Sara	  Chant	  and	  Zach	  Ernst	  (2008)	  in	  terms	  of	  rationality	  conditions	  for	  joint	  action.	  
3.	  The	  role	  of	  collective	  intentionality	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  social	  	  Joint	  intentional	  action	  is	  one	  of	  the	  basic	  building	  blocks	  for	  institutional	  reality.	  	  By	  institutional	  reality,	  we	  mean	  both	  institutions	  understood	  as	  networks	  of	  interconnected	  roles	  (that	  is,	  organizations),	  like	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  and	  social	  customs	  or	  practices,	  like	  tipping,	  shaking	  hands	  or	  speaking	  a	  language.	  	  Due	  to	  space	  constraints,	  we	  discuss	  in	  detail	  only	  the	  former.	  	  Institutions	  as	  organizations	  (henceforth	  ‘institutions’)	  we	  explain	  using	  the	  concepts	  of	  a	  status	  function	  and	  status	  role.	  	  These,	  in	  turn,	  we	  explain	  using	  the	  concepts	  of	  a	  constitutive	  rule	  and	  a	  convention.	  	  Status	  roles	  come	  with	  powers,	  rights,	  duties,	  and	  responsibilities.	  	  Many	  social	  norms	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  grounded	  in	  assignments	  of	  status	  functions	  and	  roles.	  	  The	  structure	  of	  status	  roles	  in	  an	  organization	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  distributing	  individual	  responsibility	  when	  the	  group	  is	  held	  to	  blame	  (morally	  or	  legally)	  for	  its	  actions.	  	  	  We	  begin	  by	  contrasting	  the	  language	  of	  institutional	  agency	  with	  that	  of	  informal	  (plural)	  group	  agency.	  	  Then	  we	  discuss	  conventions.	  	  Next	  we	  explain	  status	  functions	  and	  roles.	  	  We	  use	  these	  to	  explain	  the	  structure	  of	  institutions,	  and	  one	  sort	  of	  social	  norm.	  
3.1	  Singular	  Group	  Agents	  	  	  Institutional	  action	  sentences	  typically	  employ	  grammatically	  singular	  subject	  terms,	  as	  in	  [4].	  	  [4]	   The	  Supreme	  Court	  reversed	  its	  1896	  ruling	  that	  segregation	  is	  constitutional	  in	  
Brown	  vs.	  Board	  of	  Education	  in	  1954.	  	  Call	  groups	  denoted	  with	  grammatically	  singular	  terms	  singular	  group	  agents	  (again,	  without	  implying	  they	  are	  agents	  per	  se).	  Singular	  group	  agents	  appear	  to	  differ	  from	  plural	  group	  agents	  in	  several	  important	  respects.	  	  	   (a) Singular	  group	  agents	  can	  perform	  actions	  that	  individuals	  cannot,	  even	  in	  principle.	  (b) Singular	  group	  agents	  retain	  their	  identity	  through	  changes	  in	  membership.	  (c) Singular	  group	  agents	  could	  have	  had	  different	  members	  than	  they	  do.	  (d) Membership	  in	  singular	  group	  agents	  is	  socially	  constructed.	  (e) Singular	  group	  agents	  often	  act	  through	  the	  agency	  of	  some	  subgroup,	  or	  individual	  member,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  spokesperson,	  so	  that	  the	  expression	  of	  group	  agency	  seems	  not	  to	  depend	  on	  all	  its	  members	  contributing	  to	  what	  it	  does.	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These	  differences	  may	  suggest	  that	  we	  think	  of	  singular	  group	  agents	  (institutions	  in	  particular)	  as	  genuine	  group	  level	  agents.	  	  	  However,	  as	  above,	  initial	  impressions	  are	  misleading	  (Ludwig	  2014a;	  2017,	  ch.	  3-­‐5).	  First,	  many	  singular	  group	  action	  sentences,	  like	  [5],	  have	  both	  a	  distributive	  and	  collective	  reading.	  	  	  	  	  [5]	   The	  Supreme	  Court	  went	  to	  lunch.	  	  [5]	  may	  mean	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  went	  to	  lunch	  together,	  or	  that	  they	  went	  to	  lunch	  separately.	  	  This	  parallel	  with	  plural	  group	  action	  sentences	  supports	  the	  multiple	  agents	  analysis	  of	  the	  collective	  reading.	  	  Second,	  when	  singular	  group	  action	  sentences	  do	  not	  have	  a	  distributive	  reading,	  as	  for	  [4],	  it	  is	  because	  the	  verb	  expresses	  an	  action	  type	  that	  by	  definition	  requires	  contributions	  from	  multiple	  agents	  (this	  explains	  (a)).	  	  This	  is	  unrelated	  to	  the	  grammatical	  number	  of	  the	  subject.	  	  The	  same	  point	  applies	  to	  ‘We	  met	  in	  the	  library’.	  	  Neither	  of	  us	  could	  do	  this	  alone,	  even	  in	  principle.	  	  This	  is	  because	  meeting	  requires	  at	  least	  two	  people.	  	  The	  same	  goes	  for	  Supreme	  Court	  rulings.	  	  Third,	  (b)	  and	  (c)	  are	  explained	  by	  (d).	  	  To	  be	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  is	  to	  accept	  an	  institutional	  role	  (on	  which	  more	  below)	  by	  being	  nominated	  by	  the	  President,	  accepting	  the	  nomination,	  and	  being	  confirmed	  by	  the	  Senate.	  	  This	  is	  different	  from	  merely	  being	  arbitrarily	  grouped	  with	  other	  things.	  Most	  importantly,	  it	  is	  a	  time-­‐indexed	  condition,	  for	  the	  status	  that	  suffices	  for	  membership	  can	  be	  removed	  (by	  resigning,	  e.g.),	  and	  assigned	  to	  someone	  else.	  	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  members	  of	  the	  group	  at	  a	  time:	  when	  the	  group	  acts,	  its	  members	  at	  that	  time	  contribute	  to	  what	  it	  then	  does	  (Ludwig	  2014a;	  2017,	  ch.	  5,	  sec.	  2).	  	  Thus,	  [4]	  says	  that	  the	  1954	  members	  of	  the	  Court	  reversed	  the	  ruling	  of	  its	  1896	  members.	  	  No	  super	  agent	  is	  required.	  	  	  	  Fourth,	  the	  fact	  that	  institutional	  membership	  is	  time	  indexed	  and	  socially	  constructed	  also	  explains	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  the	  institution	  to	  have	  had	  different	  members	  (Ludwig	  2014a;	  2017,	  ch.	  5,	  sec.	  3).	  	  For	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  different	  individuals	  to	  have	  been	  assigned	  the	  relevant	  status.	  	  This	  no	  more	  requires	  an	  agent	  over	  and	  above	  its	  members	  than	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  president	  might	  have	  been	  someone	  else	  requires	  a	  super	  president	  to	  shadow	  the	  elected	  one	  (contra,	  e.g.,	  Sheehy	  (2006)).	  	  	  	  The	  explanation	  of	  (e)	  and	  (f)	  requires	  the	  concepts	  of	  a	  status	  function	  and	  a	  status	  role.	  	  First,	  we	  take	  up	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  convention,	  which	  we	  will	  employ	  in	  explaining	  status	  functions.	  
3.2	  Conventions	  	  ‘Convention’	  is	  used	  to	  express	  a	  number	  of	  related	  concepts.	  	  In	  one	  sense	  a	  convention	  is	  simply	  a	  custom,	  like	  what	  people	  wear,	  or	  whether	  they	  use	  chopsticks	  or	  forks.	  	  We	  focus	  on	  a	  narrower	  notion—which	  also	  concerned,	  e.g.,	  Lewis	  in	  the	  classic	  (1969)—on	  which	  a	  convention	  rests	  on	  a	  (at	  least)	  tacit	  agreement	  in	  a	  group	  about	  how	  to	  solve	  a	  coordination	  problem.	  	  A	  simple	  example	  is	  a	  convention	  for	  driving	  on	  the	  right	  or	  left	  side	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of	  the	  road	  to	  avoid	  collisions.	  	  We	  want	  cars	  driving	  in	  opposite	  directions	  to	  consistently	  choose	  different	  sides.	  	  No	  one	  can	  solve	  the	  problem	  alone,	  so	  to	  solve	  it	  we	  must	  enter	  into	  a	  kind	  of	  agreement	  about	  which	  side	  to	  drive	  on.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  solved	  when	  everyone	  agrees	  to	  follow	  the	  same	  rule	  (idealizing	  a	  bit	  here).	  	  However,	  for	  this	  to	  be	  a	  genuine	  convention,	  more	  is	  required	  than	  that	  agents	  follow	  the	  same	  rule.	  	  This	  could	  happen	  even	  if	  each	  regards	  the	  others	  simply	  as	  states	  of	  nature	  in	  a	  strategic	  game.	  	  A	  convention	  is	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  that	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  joint	  solution.	  	  This	  happens	  when	  each	  member	  of	  the	  relevant	  group	  we-­‐intends	  that	  whenever	  any	  of	  them	  are	  in	  the	  relevant	  sort	  of	  situation	  (driving	  with	  others	  on	  a	  public	  road),	  they	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  rule	  to	  drive,	  e.g.,	  on	  the	  right	  (Jankovic	  2011;	  2014,	  ch.	  6).	  	  This	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  them	  having	  appropriate	  conditional	  we-­‐intentions	  to	  do	  their	  parts	  (realizing	  a	  tacit	  agreement).	  	  Conventions	  then	  are	  grounded	  in	  shared	  conditional	  intentions	  (Ludwig	  2015b),	  which	  are	  a	  structure	  of	  conditional	  we-­‐intentions	  of	  members	  of	  the	  group	  in	  which	  the	  convention	  is	  maintained.	  	  
3.3	  Status	  Functions	  and	  Roles	  	  A	  status	  function	  is	  assigned	  to	  objects,	  events,	  or	  persons	  (token	  or	  type)	  in	  social	  transactions.	  	  A	  status	  function	  is	  an	  agentive	  function.	  	  An	  agentive	  function	  is	  defined	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  use	  “to	  which	  agents	  intentionally	  put	  objects”	  (Searle	  1995,	  p.	  20),	  such	  as	  being	  a	  chair	  or	  a	  saw.	  What’s	  special	  about	  status	  functions	  among	  agentive	  function	  is	  that	  they	  can	  perform	  their	  functions	  only	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  collectively	  accepted	  as	  having	  them	  (Searle	  1995,	  ch.	  2).	  	  Examples	  are	  being	  a	  king	  in	  chess,	  a	  twenty-­‐dollar	  bill,	  a	  royal	  seal,	  a	  judge,	  a	  ruling,	  or	  a	  border	  between	  countries.	  	  Thus,	  nothing	  can	  function	  as	  a	  twenty-­‐dollar	  bill	  unless	  it	  is	  collectively	  accepted	  in	  the	  relevant	  community	  as	  a	  unit	  of	  exchange	  in	  monetary	  transactions.	  	  The	  physical	  characteristics	  are	  insufficient.	  	  In	  contrast,	  something	  with	  the	  right	  physical	  characteristics	  can	  saw	  a	  log	  in	  two,	  even	  if	  no	  one	  thinks	  of	  it	  as	  a	  saw.	  	  	  	  How	  can	  collectively	  accepting	  something	  as	  having	  a	  certain	  function	  be	  crucial	  to	  its	  ability	  to	  perform	  the	  function?	  	  The	  answer	  is	  that	  the	  relevant	  function	  is	  defined	  in	  a	  way	  that	  leaves	  open	  what	  particular	  objects	  are	  to	  perform	  it	  (Ludwig	  2014b;	  2017,	  chs.	  6-­‐10).	  	  	  	  The	  rules	  that	  determine	  the	  function	  are	  constitutive	  rules—rules	  the	  intentional	  following	  of	  which	  partially	  constitutes	  the	  type	  of	  activity	  they	  govern	  (Searle	  1969).	  	  The	  rules	  of	  chess,	  for	  example,	  are	  constitutive	  rules.	  	  In	  contrast,	  Robert’s	  Rules	  of	  Order	  are	  regulative	  rules	  because	  they	  govern	  a	  kind	  of	  activity	  that	  exists	  independently	  of	  the	  rules	  being	  followed.	  	  	  	  The	  rules	  of	  chess	  define	  functions	  for	  certain	  objects	  in	  its	  play.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  white	  king	  belongs	  to	  the	  player	  who	  makes	  the	  first	  move.	  	  Positioned	  four	  squares	  from	  the	  right,	  it	  can	  be	  moved	  one	  square	  in	  any	  direction,	  if	  the	  square	  is	  not	  occupied	  by	  white’s	  pieces,	  and	  not	  threatened	  by	  black’s;	  it	  takes	  any	  opposing	  piece	  occupying	  the	  square.	  	  If	  it	  is	  in	  check	  and	  cannot	  move,	  black	  wins.	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While	  the	  rules	  define	  the	  role	  of	  the	  king,	  they	  do	  not	  fix	  what	  object	  is	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  role.	  	  Thus,	  two	  people	  who	  intend	  to	  play	  chess	  face	  a	  coordination	  problem.	  	  The	  solution	  consists	  in	  their	  accepting	  the	  same	  objects	  for	  the	  roles	  defined	  by	  the	  rules	  of	  chess.	  This	  coordination	  on	  particular	  things	  to	  play	  these	  roles	  is	  a	  convention,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  previous	  section.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  coordination	  on	  types	  to	  play	  roles	  in	  recurring	  social	  activities,	  collective	  acceptance	  amounts	  to	  adopting	  conditional	  we-­‐intentions	  to	  use	  the	  relevant	  type	  of	  object	  in	  the	  roles	  in	  that	  activity	  type.	  	  Thus,	  a	  twenty-­‐dollar	  bill	  has	  the	  status	  function	  it	  does	  because	  it	  is	  collectively	  accepted	  that	  things	  of	  its	  type	  are	  to	  be	  used	  in	  certain	  commercial	  transactions,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  never	  used.	  	  	  	  A	  status	  role	  is	  a	  special	  sort	  of	  status	  function	  assigned	  to	  an	  agent	  where	  (a)	  the	  agent	  must	  be	  part	  of	  the	  group	  that	  collectively	  accepts	  the	  assignment,	  and	  (b)	  the	  function	  is	  partly	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  the	  agent	  in	  the	  role	  is	  to	  interact	  with	  other	  agents,	  events,	  and	  objects	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  status	  roles	  and	  functions	  (Ludwig	  2014	  sec.	  5;	  2017	  ch.	  10).	  	  Examples	  are	  being	  a	  judge,	  policemen,	  senator,	  professor,	  student,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Thus,	  membership	  in	  an	  institution	  is	  a	  status	  role,	  and	  this	  provides	  a	  precise	  sense	  in	  which	  membership	  in	  an	  institution	  is	  socially	  constructed	  (Ludwig	  2017,	  ch.	  11).	  	  
3.4	  Institutions	  as	  networks	  of	  status	  roles	  	  We	  can	  define	  institutions	  as	  networks	  of	  status	  roles	  designed	  for	  coordinating	  joint	  intentional	  action	  for	  certain	  purposes	  by	  their	  possessors	  (Ludwig	  2017,	  ch.	  10-­‐11).	  	  For	  example,	  to	  join	  the	  army	  is	  to	  be	  assigned	  (and	  to	  accept)	  a	  status	  function.	  	  Though	  it	  is	  presupposed	  that	  roles	  are	  occupied	  voluntarily,	  typically	  there	  will	  be	  provisions	  for	  how	  to	  treat	  someone	  who	  does	  not	  perform	  the	  duties	  associated	  with	  the	  role.	  	  In	  joining	  the	  army,	  one	  acquires	  the	  determinable	  status	  role	  of	  being	  soldier,	  and	  a	  determinate	  of	  that	  designated	  by	  rank	  and	  unit,	  as	  well	  as	  more	  specific	  status	  roles	  within	  organizations	  in	  the	  army.	  The	  effective	  functioning	  of	  the	  organization	  (its	  fulfilling	  the	  purposes	  for	  which	  it	  is	  designed)	  depends	  on	  enough	  of	  its	  members	  performing	  adequately	  in	  their	  roles	  vis-­‐á-­‐vis	  others.	  	  The	  roles	  in	  an	  organization	  are	  typically	  defined	  in	  terms	  both	  of	  how	  one	  is	  to	  interact	  with	  other	  members	  and	  how	  one	  is	  to	  interact	  with	  various	  non-­‐members,	  since	  organizations	  typically	  have	  status	  roles	  in	  larger	  institutional	  settings.	  	  An	  organization	  can	  also	  assign	  status	  functions	  to	  others	  (without	  their	  acquiescence)	  to	  determine	  how	  its	  members	  are	  to	  treat	  them.	  	  For	  example,	  designating	  others	  as	  enemy	  soldiers	  or	  civilians	  assigns	  them	  status	  functions	  (though	  not	  status	  roles)	  that	  govern	  how	  they	  are	  to	  be	  treated.	  	  	  The	  possibility	  of	  perpetual	  existence	  of	  institutions	  comes	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  realization	  of	  the	  relevant	  organizational	  structures	  in	  successive	  (often	  overlapping)	  groups	  of	  agents.	  	  An	  institutional	  group	  may	  survive	  periods	  in	  which	  it	  lacks	  members	  when	  it	  has	  a	  place	  in	  a	  larger	  group.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  22nd	  regiment	  of	  the	  United	  States	  army	  was	  initially	  formed	  in	  the	  war	  of	  1812,	  but	  disbanded	  and	  then	  reconstituted	  for	  the	  Indian	  wars	  of	  the	  1860s,	  and	  it	  has	  been	  disbanded	  and	  reconstituted	  a	  number	  of	  times	  since	  then.	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3.5	  Proxy	  Agency	  in	  Institutional	  Action	  	  A	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  institutional	  agency	  is	  the	  capacity	  to	  do	  things	  through	  authorized	  agents.	  	  We	  call	  these	  proxy	  agents	  (Ludwig	  2014b).	  	  How	  does	  this	  work?	  Take	  the	  case	  of	  the	  spokesperson.	  	  Both	  groups	  and	  individuals	  can	  have	  spokespersons.	  	  This	  shows	  that	  proxy	  agency	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  groups.	  	  However,	  in	  both	  cases,	  the	  possibility	  of	  proxy	  agency	  relies	  on	  a	  background	  social	  agreement	  focusing	  on	  the	  spokesperson	  playing	  a	  role,	  by	  the	  exercise	  of	  her	  agency,	  in	  a	  social	  transaction	  between	  one	  person	  or	  group	  and	  others.	  	  Being	  a	  spokesperson	  then	  is	  a	  status	  role.	  	  The	  key	  to	  proxy	  agency	  is	  authorization.	  	  Authorization	  is	  the	  assignment	  of	  a	  status	  role.	  We	  consider	  the	  simplest	  case	  in	  which	  members	  of	  the	  group,	  e.g.,	  a	  club,	  designate	  a	  member	  by	  consensus	  to	  serve	  as	  spokesperson,	  and	  agree	  on	  what	  message	  the	  spokesperson	  is	  to	  convey.	  	  The	  purpose	  is	  to	  publicly	  commit	  the	  group	  to	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  message.	  Both	  audience	  and	  group	  understand	  the	  exchange	  involving	  a	  spokesperson	  as	  their	  engaging	  in	  a	  joint	  intentional	  action.	  	  The	  audience’s	  role	  is	  to	  recognize	  the	  spokesperson	  as	  acting	  under	  her	  authority	  to	  represent	  the	  group	  and	  attend	  to	  her	  message	  in	  that	  capacity.	  	  The	  spokesperson’s	  role	  is	  to	  produce	  an	  utterance	  act	  whose	  content	  is	  the	  message	  that	  the	  group	  aims	  to	  convey	  to	  its	  audience.	  	  The	  utterance	  act	  itself	  then	  has	  a	  status	  function	  in	  the	  transaction	  with	  the	  audience.	  The	  name	  for	  this	  status	  function	  is	  a	  group	  announcement.	  	  In	  this	  we	  borrow	  the	  language	  of	  speech	  acts	  applied	  to	  individuals,	  but	  its	  significance	  is	  different,	  because	  it	  is	  not	  an	  announcement	  of	  the	  spokesperson,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  in	  the	  ordinary	  sense	  a	  speech	  act	  by	  the	  group	  because	  the	  group	  does	  not	  have	  an	  intention	  to	  assert	  something	  in	  the	  way	  an	  individual	  does.	  	  	  	  A	  conceptually	  necessary	  condition	  on	  the	  spokesperson’s	  act	  counting	  as	  the	  group’s	  announcing	  something	  is	  her	  being	  designated	  as	  their	  spokesperson.	  	  Thus,	  when	  the	  group	  announces	  something	  through	  a	  spokesperson,	  every	  member	  of	  the	  group	  contributes	  constitutively	  to	  the	  group	  announcement.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  even	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  proxy	  agency	  is	  brought	  under	  the	  multiple	  agents	  account	  of	  institutional	  agency.	  	  This	  simple	  structure	  may	  be	  complicated	  along	  at	  least	  two	  dimensions	  (Ludwig	  2016b).	  	  	  	  First,	  the	  group	  can	  give	  more	  autonomy	  to	  the	  proxy	  agent.	  	  The	  proxy	  may	  be	  authorized,	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  specific	  way	  in	  which	  to	  convey	  a	  policy,	  to	  answer	  questions	  about	  it,	  or	  even	  to	  determine	  policy,	  or	  to	  make	  decisions	  that	  commit	  the	  group	  to	  various	  projects.	  	  In	  this	  way	  decision-­‐making	  may	  be	  officially	  delegated	  to	  a	  subgroup	  or	  individual.	  	  The	  notion	  of	  a	  group	  decision	  here	  (like	  that	  of	  a	  group	  announcement)	  is	  constructed	  out	  of	  the	  social	  arrangements	  that	  give	  it	  content.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Second,	  the	  power	  to	  authorize	  individuals	  or	  subgroups	  to	  act	  as	  proxy	  agents	  for	  the	  group	  may	  also	  be	  assigned	  to	  a	  status	  role.	  	  The	  authorizations	  made	  by	  those	  proxies	  are	  then	  authorizations	  by	  the	  group	  by	  proxy.	  	  And	  this	  may	  extend	  through	  a	  chain	  of	  proxy	  agents.	  	  In	  more	  complicated	  cases,	  the	  constitutive	  contribution	  of	  many	  members	  of	  an	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organization	  may	  come	  to	  little	  more	  than	  their	  roles	  in	  constitutively	  sustaining	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  organization	  within	  which	  these	  authorizations	  are	  made	  and	  exercised.	  Yet,	  the	  basic	  conceptual	  structure	  remains	  the	  same.	  	  
3.6	  Social	  Norms	  and	  Status	  Functions	  	  There	  is	  an	  important	  connection	  between	  social	  norms	  (in	  one	  sense)	  and	  status	  functions	  and	  roles	  (Ludwig	  2017	  ch.	  10,	  sec.	  1-­‐3).	  	  In	  the	  relevant	  sense	  of	  social	  norm,	  to	  violate	  a	  social	  norm	  is	  to	  make	  a	  mistake	  or	  to	  do	  something	  wrong	  internal	  to	  the	  type	  of	  social	  action	  the	  norm	  governs.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  policeman	  who	  makes	  a	  false	  arrest	  under	  the	  color	  of	  law	  has	  violated	  a	  norm	  internal	  to	  the	  type	  of	  action	  he	  undertakes.	  	  	  	  How	  are	  social	  norms	  in	  this	  sense	  grounded	  in	  status	  functions?	  	  Things	  with	  status	  functions	  have	  associated	  norms	  determined	  by	  their	  role	  in	  the	  action	  type	  for	  which	  they	  are	  designed.	  	  There	  are	  three	  kinds.	  	  First,	  there	  are	  norms	  derived	  from	  the	  constitutive	  rules	  governing	  the	  action	  type.	  	  These	  define	  what	  has	  to	  be	  done	  for	  the	  action	  type	  to	  be	  instantiated.	  	  Thus,	  the	  rules	  of	  chess	  provide	  norms	  for	  chess.	  	  Second,	  there	  are	  norms	  derived	  from	  the	  conventions	  that	  attach	  functions	  defined	  by	  constitutive	  rules	  to	  particular	  objects,	  states	  or	  events.	  	  These	  are	  norms	  about	  what	  objects	  or	  types	  have	  functions	  in	  relevant	  social	  transactions.	  	  Third,	  there	  are	  norms	  that	  are	  derived	  from	  ideals	  for	  a	  type	  of	  action	  that	  can	  be	  instantiated	  without	  conforming	  to	  the	  ideal.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  many	  competitive	  sports	  there	  are	  expectations	  about	  how	  play	  is	  to	  go,	  violations	  of	  which	  are	  assigned	  a	  penalty.	  	  These	  rules	  provide	  norms	  for	  the	  activity,	  which	  are	  not	  constitutive,	  and	  not	  derived	  from	  conventions	  that	  attach	  status	  functions	  to	  particular	  objects,	  but	  rather	  are	  derived	  from	  a	  canonical	  conception	  of	  play.	  	  The	  canonical	  conception	  is	  a	  regulative	  ideal	  for	  play	  of	  the	  game.	  	  The	  same	  goes	  for	  many	  other	  types	  of	  essentially	  collective	  intentional	  action	  types.	  	  This	  extends	  to	  status	  roles.	  	  Status	  roles	  provide	  norms	  for	  their	  occupiers	  determined	  by	  their	  design	  function.	  These	  define	  the	  powers,	  rights	  and	  duties	  of	  the	  role	  players	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  others	  given	  their	  roles.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  class,	  a	  professor	  has	  the	  power	  and	  duty	  to	  assign	  grades	  and	  the	  duty	  to	  do	  so	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  student	  performance.	  	  Students	  have	  a	  right	  to	  expect	  that	  grades	  are	  assigned	  fairly.	  This	  provides	  one	  sense	  in	  which	  social	  norms	  are	  constitutive	  of	  social	  institutions	  and	  practices.	  	  They	  may	  of	  course	  conflict	  with	  each	  other	  and	  with	  others	  sorts	  of	  norms,	  such	  as	  moral	  norms.	  	  This	  is	  illustrated	  by	  the	  case	  of	  a	  guard	  at	  a	  concentration	  camp.	  
4.	  Collective	  Attitudes	  Other	  than	  Intention	  	  	  The	  practice	  of	  ascribing	  psychological	  attitudes	  to	  groups	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  intentions.	  	  Ascriptions	  of	  beliefs,	  desires,	  and	  emotions	  to	  groups	  are	  commonplace	  in	  everyday	  talk,	  as	  illustrated	  in	  [6]-­‐[8].	  	  	  [6]	   The	  Democratic	  Party	  believes	  that	  all	  Americans	  have	  the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  wage.	  [7]	   North	  Korea	  wants	  to	  sign	  a	  peace	  treaty	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  	  [8]	   Russia	  is	  angry	  at	  Turkey.	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Moreover,	  many	  social-­‐scientific	  and	  philosophical	  explanations	  involve	  irreducible	  appeal	  to	  collective	  attitudes.	  For	  example,	  rational	  choice	  theory	  has	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  common	  knowledge,	  because	  the	  strategic	  situation	  of	  agents	  in	  an	  interdependent	  choice	  is	  sensitive	  to	  whether	  they	  have	  common	  (or	  just	  mutual)	  knowledge	  of	  certain	  facts	  (Halpern	  1986;	  Schelling	  1960;	  Lewis	  1969).	  	  More	  controversially,	  group	  guilt	  is	  invoked	  to	  account	  for	  the	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  that	  members	  of	  a	  group	  may	  harbor	  regarding	  a	  group	  action	  that	  they	  took	  no	  part	  in	  (Gilbert	  1997).	  	  	  The	  main	  issues	  in	  this	  area	  are	  analogous	  to	  those	  for	  collective	  intentions.	  There	  are	  psychological	  and	  ontological	  questions.	  	  The	  psychological	  questions	  concern	  the	  nature	  and	  structure	  of	  collective	  attitudes	  and	  their	  connection	  with	  states	  of	  individuals	  that	  constitute	  the	  relevant	  collectives.	  For	  example,	  common	  knowledge	  is	  initially	  glossed	  as	  knowledge	  that	  is	  public,	  and	  public	  knowledge	  is	  explained	  as	  knowledge	  a	  group	  has	  just	  in	  case	  everyone	  in	  the	  group	  knows	  that	  everyone	  knows	  (and	  so	  on	  ad	  infinitum)	  that	  something	  is	  the	  case	  (Lewis	  1969).	  Is	  the	  regress	  involved	  conceptually	  problematic?	  Is	  it	  psychologically	  plausible	  that	  regular	  people	  would	  have	  such	  attitudes?	  	  Does	  the	  regressive	  formulation	  give	  the	  correct	  explication	  of	  the	  relevant	  notion	  of	  publicity?	  	  	  The	  ontological	  questions	  concern	  the	  ontological	  commitments	  of	  ascriptions	  like	  [6]-­‐[8],	  specifically,	  whether	  they	  commit	  us	  to	  group	  entities	  with	  genuine	  psychological	  states.	  The	  major	  groups	  of	  views	  concerning	  this	  issue	  are	  eliminativist,	  singularist	  (or	  individualist),	  and	  pluralist.	  	  	  (It	  might	  be	  thought	  that	  each	  of	  these	  has	  its	  appropriate	  context	  of	  application,	  but	  below	  we	  consider	  them	  as	  purporting	  to	  give	  a	  uniform	  account.)	  	  	  	  Eliminativists	  reject	  all	  talk	  of	  group	  attitudes.	  They	  may	  consider	  ascriptions	  of	  psychological	  attitudes	  to	  groups	  to	  be	  false	  or	  metaphorical.	  These	  accounts	  have	  not	  been	  explored	  much,	  but	  some	  remarks	  by	  Quinton	  (1975)	  may	  be	  interpreted	  in	  this	  way.	  	  Singularist	  accounts	  (the	  term	  is	  due	  to	  Gilbert	  (1987,	  1989,	  2006))	  hold	  that	  collective	  attitude	  ascriptions	  are	  true,	  but	  consider	  them	  to	  be	  making	  claims	  about	  states	  of	  individuals,	  such	  as	  individual	  beliefs,	  desires,	  and	  intentions.	  	  	  	  Eliminativist	  and	  singularist	  accounts	  are	  both	  compatible	  with	  methodological	  individualism,	  understood	  as	  the	  conjunction	  of	  the	  following	  two	  theses:	  	   (1) We	  can	  understand	  and	  explain	  individual	  action	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  individual’s	  own	  attitudes	  and	  reasons	  (which	  may	  refer	  to	  other	  agents	  and	  their	  attitudes	  and	  reasons,	  and	  to	  reducible	  group	  attitudes	  and	  reasons)	  together	  with	  physical	  and	  nonsocial	  facts.	  (2) Social	  ontology	  consists	  solely	  of	  the	  actions	  and	  activities	  of	  individuals	  and	  their	  relations	  and	  interactions,	  and	  reference	  to	  groups	  and	  group	  properties	  is	  reducible	  to	  the	  bases	  in	  (1)	  and	  (2).	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Within	  the	  singularist	  camp,	  we	  may	  distinguish	  between	  summative	  and	  non-­‐summative	  accounts	  (following	  Quinton).	  	  Summative	  accounts	  hold	  that	  a	  logically	  necessary	  condition	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  an	  ascription	  of	  the	  form	  	  	   Group	  G	  ψ-­‐s	  that	  p	  (or	  to	  P)	  	  is	  that	  	  	  all	  (or	  most	  or	  enough)	  members	  of	  G	  ψ	  that	  p	  (or	  ψ	  to	  P),	  	  	  where	  ψ	  is	  a	  propositional	  attitude	  verb,	  p	  a	  sentence,	  P	  a	  verb	  phrase.	  Call	  this	  condition	  the	  summation	  condition.	  For	  example,	  we	  might	  say	  the	  curriculum	  committee	  wants	  to	  change	  the	  distribution	  requirements	  only	  if	  all	  (or	  most	  or	  enough)	  members	  of	  the	  curriculum	  committee	  want	  to	  change	  the	  distribution	  requirements.	  Gilbert	  (1987)	  criticizes	  summative	  accounts	  that	  hold	  the	  appropriate	  summation	  condition	  to	  be	  both	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  collective	  attitude	  ascription	  (Quinton	  1975),	  as	  well	  as	  those	  that	  also	  require	  that	  it	  be	  common	  knowledge	  in	  the	  group	  that	  the	  summation	  condition	  holds;	  Corlett	  (2007)	  has	  responded	  to	  a	  number	  of	  Gilbert’s	  criticisms.	  
	  Summative	  accounts	  of	  both	  kinds	  appear	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  counterexamples.	  First,	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  too	  weak.	  Suppose	  that	  each	  member	  of	  Congress	  believes	  that	  the	  minimum	  wage	  should	  be	  raised	  and	  that	  this	  is	  common	  knowledge,	  but	  that	  Congress	  has	  not	  taken	  a	  vote	  on	  the	  issue,	  and,	  for	  various	  reasons,	  is	  not	  going	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  would	  be	  odd	  to	  say	  that	  Congress	  believes	  that	  the	  minimum	  wage	  should	  be	  raised	  	  	  Summative	  accounts	  also	  appear	  to	  be	  too	  strong.	  We	  can	  use	  the	  discursive	  dilemma	  (described	  by	  Pettit	  (2001,	  2003,	  2007))	  to	  illustrate	  how	  it	  can	  appear	  that	  a	  group	  may	  believe/want/intend	  that	  p	  even	  though	  none	  if	  its	  members	  believe/want/intend	  that	  p.	  (Schmitt	  (1994)	  gives	  a	  similar	  argument.)	  Suppose	  that	  a	  company	  (call	  it	  “All-­‐for-­‐Safety”)	  is	  deciding	  whether	  to	  institute	  pay	  cuts	  in	  order	  to	  introduce	  several	  safety	  measures.	  For	  simplicity,	  suppose	  All-­‐for-­‐Safety	  is	  a	  cooperative	  so	  that	  the	  employees	  own	  it.	  	  The	  decision	  is	  made	  by	  the	  employees	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  three	  considerations:	  (1)	  whether	  the	  danger	  is	  serious	  enough	  to	  justify	  the	  cut;	  (2)	  whether	  the	  measures	  to	  be	  introduced	  are	  effective	  enough	  to	  justify	  the	  cut;	  (3)	  whether	  the	  employee	  can	  bear	  the	  pay	  sacrifice.	  Suppose	  that	  an	  individual	  employee	  will	  vote	  for	  the	  pay	  cut	  just	  in	  case	  she	  votes	  yes	  on	  all	  three	  considerations.	  The	  company	  may	  employ	  two	  decision	  procedures.	  It	  may	  employ	  a	  conclusion-­‐centered	  procedure,	  which	  consists	  in	  aggregating	  individual	  employees’	  votes	  on	  whether	  they	  will	  take	  the	  pay	  cut.	  Or	  it	  may	  employ	  a	  premise-­‐centered	  procedure,	  which	  consists	  in	  aggregating	  individual	  votes	  on	  the	  three	  considerations,	  and	  adopting	  the	  pay	  cut	  if	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  employees	  vote	  yes	  on	  each	  individual	  consideration.	  Suppose	  that	  Safety-­‐First	  adopts	  a	  premise-­‐centered	  approach	  and	  that	  the	  employees	  vote	  as	  follows.	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   Dangerous	   Effective	   Bearable	   Conclusion-­‐centered	  1/3rd	  	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   No	  1/3rd	  	   Yes	   No	   Yes	   No	  1/3rd	  	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   No	  Premise-­‐centered	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  (P)	  /	  No	  (C)	  	  In	  this	  case,	  it	  appears	  that	  (9)	  is	  true	  and	  (10)	  false.	  	  	  [9]	  	   All-­‐for-­‐Safety	  believes	  that	  the	  employees	  should	  accept	  a	  pay	  cut.	  [10]	  	   All/most/some	  members	  of	  Safety-­‐First	  believe	  that	  the	  employees	  should	  accept	  a	  pay	  cut.	  	  	  One	  may	  reject	  summative	  accounts	  without	  rejecting	  singularism.	  For	  example,	  the	  discursive	  dilemma	  plausibly	  shows	  that	  a	  group	  belief	  ascription	  can	  be	  true	  when	  the	  corresponding	  summation	  conditions	  are	  false.	  	  If	  that’s	  right,	  an	  ascription	  of	  a	  collective	  belief	  that	  p	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  some	  configuration	  of	  individual	  beliefs	  that	  p.	  But	  the	  individual	  intentional	  states	  to	  which	  an	  ascription	  of	  collective	  attitude	  reduces	  do	  not	  have	  to	  match	  the	  psychological	  mode	  and	  content	  of	  the	  collective	  attitude,	  as	  postulated	  by	  the	  summation	  condition.	  For	  example,	  one	  may	  hold	  that	  group	  G	  believes	  that	  p	  if	  members	  of	  the	  group	  jointly	  accept	  the	  judgment-­‐aggregating	  procedure	  according	  to	  which,	  if	  most	  members	  of	  the	  group	  believe	  p	  and	  q,	  and	  r	  follows	  from	  p	  and	  q,	  then	  G	  believes	  r.	  	  	  Finally,	  on	  pluralist	  accounts,	  collective	  attitude	  ascriptions	  cannot	  be	  understood	  solely	  using	  the	  concepts	  drawn	  from	  individual	  theory	  of	  mind	  and	  action.	  For	  example,	  (Gilbert	  2006)	  explains	  collective	  attitudes	  (in	  general)	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  basic	  notion	  of	  joint	  commitment.	  	  In	  general,	  in	  joint	  commitment,	  we	  commit	  to	  holding	  a	  certain	  attitude	  as	  a	  body.	  For	  example,	  if	  we	  jointly	  commit	  to	  believing,	  as	  a	  body,	  that	  democracy	  is	  the	  best	  form	  of	  government,	  we	  collectively	  believe	  this.	  If	  we	  jointly	  commit	  as	  a	  body	  to	  feeling	  guilty	  about	  a	  certain	  action,	  we	  feel	  collective	  guilt	  over	  that	  action.	  And	  so	  on.	  	  	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  eliminativist	  and	  singularist	  accounts,	  pluralist	  accounts	  are	  not	  compatible	  with	  methodological	  individualism.	  	  Philosophers	  have	  discussed	  collective	  belief	  (Gilbert	  and	  Pilchman	  2014;	  Gilbert	  1987,	  1989,	  1994,	  1996;	  Pettit	  2003;	  List	  and	  Pettit	  2011;	  Tollefsen	  2007;	  Tuomela	  1992;	  Schmitt	  2016),	  collective	  memory	  (Wertsch	  2009;	  Roediger	  and	  Abel	  2015;	  Olick,	  Vinitzky-­‐Seroussi,	  and	  Levy	  2011;	  Michaelian	  and	  Sutton	  2013;	  Hirst	  and	  Stone	  2015),	  and	  collective	  moral	  attitudes	  such	  as	  guilt,	  pride,	  remorse,	  and	  shame	  (Gilbert	  1997,	  2002,	  2001;	  Kutz	  2000;	  May	  1992;	  Tollefsen	  2006),	  as	  well	  as	  collective	  emotions	  more	  generally	  (Huebner	  2011;	  Wilson	  2001).	  	  
5.	  Summary	  and	  Conclusion	  	  Attributions	  of	  intentionality	  to	  collectives	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  social	  world.	  	  Our	  focus	  has	  been	  on	  collective	  intention	  and	  action.	  These	  are	  among	  the	  	  
	   14	  
fundamental	  building	  blocks	  of	  the	  social	  world.	  	  They	  are	  implicated	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  agreements,	  conventions,	  status	  functions,	  institutions,	  and	  social	  norms.	  	  We	  have	  suggested	  that	  collective	  intention	  and	  action	  rest	  on	  the	  capacity	  of	  individuals	  to	  form	  intentions	  with	  a	  distinctively	  cooperative	  content.	  An	  account	  of	  these	  we-­‐intentions	  contributes	  not	  only	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  fundamental	  structure	  of	  the	  social	  world,	  but	  also	  of	  the	  capacities	  of	  mind	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  have	  the	  kinds	  of	  sociality	  we	  have.	  	  	  The	  self-­‐conscious	  deployment	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  joint	  intentional	  activity	  patterns	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  constitutive	  rule	  for	  social	  behavior,	  which	  prepares	  the	  way	  for	  the	  concepts	  of	  a	  status	  function,	  and	  of	  a	  status	  role,	  networks	  of	  which	  form	  the	  fabric	  of	  institutional	  reality.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  social	  ontology,	  the	  study	  of	  collective	  intentionality	  has	  implications	  on	  further	  areas	  of	  traditional	  interest	  to	  philosophers	  and	  social	  scientists	  such	  as	  cooperation,	  collective	  attitudes,	  responsibility,	  rationality,	  problem	  solving,	  attention,	  memory,	  and	  emotion.	  	  A	  further	  discussion	  of	  these	  and	  other	  topics	  can	  be	  found	  in	  (Jankovic	  and	  Ludwig	  2016).	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